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Abstract
At the 80th anniversary celebration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 1
July 2001, Jiang Zemin called on the party to admit into its ranks of 'outstanding
social elements' of private entrepreneurs, professionals, technical and managerial
personnel from non-state firms and MNCs. Party ideologues, however, have raised
a great hue and cry. In order to establish his political legacy, the CCP leadership
has intensified the campaign to educate its cadres and members. Reform and
development have bourgeoisified and benefited many party members and cadres.
Jiang's public support of the capitalists is not going against the tide but is a
recognition of reality instead. In fact, to continue to grow and expand, the party
must embrace the better educated and the most enterprising in society. The
capitalists within the party will certainly be catalysts to quicken the transformation
of the party. In its attempt to admit capitalists, has the CCP unknowingly let in
the Trojan horse? Jiang Zemin's original aim may have been to strengthen the
party-state by broadening its social base. And as the party metamorphoses, perhaps
into a kind of social democratic party, Jiang will be favourably judged for paving
the way for such a metamorphosis. Nevertheless, it is not an easy transition:
insurmountable difficulties lie ahead for the party leadership.
Introduction
In his controversial speech celebrating the 80th anniversary of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) on 1 July 2001, Jiang Zemin called on the party to
admit those 'outstanding elements' of society such as private entrepreneurs,
professionals, technical and managerial personnel from various non-state
sectors, including those employed by MNCs.1  According to Jiang, these
are people who can also make a positive contribution to the rebuilding of
China's socialism, and should therefore not be excluded from the party.
Whether they are politically progressive (xianjin) or backward (luohou)
should not be judged purely on whether they are property-owning classes.
'Private entrepreneurs' – actually an official euphemism for 'capital-
ists' or 'private businessmen' – were hitherto publicly barred from the
party. The proposed membership relaxation has generated much en-
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thusiasm from many private businessmen wanting to join the party.
Immediately after Jiang's speech, more than '100,000 private entrepre-
neurs' were reported to have submitted applications to join the party.
The party's organization department (headed by Zeng Qinghong) is
planning to recruit 200,000 private entrepreneurs before the 16th Con-
gress in September 2002.2
Traditionally, the CCP was supposed to represent the interests of only
five major groups, i.e., workers, peasants, intellectuals, members of the
PLA (People's Liberation Army), and government officials and cadres.
The majority of the original rank and file of the party was basically
drawn from the 'proletariat' background. In championing the causes of
capitalists, Jiang's initiative has been hailed by supporters as a theoreti-
cal breakthrough, throwing off the party's old dogmas, particularly the
shackle of class. At the same time, for Jiang as General Secretary to openly
embrace capitalists – the antithesis of the proletariat class – amounts to
dropping an ideological bombshell on the conservative wing of the party.
Naturally, the party's ideologues have raised a great hue and cry. The
strength of the opposition from these party diehards seems to have taken
Jiang by surprise.
The opposition came into the open with the publication on the Chi-
nese Internet of a widely circulated Wanyan-shu or 'a petition of ten-
thousand words,' attributed to a group of conservative party veterans
led by long-time leftist critic Deng Liqun. Prior to Jiang's 'July 1 speech,'
several provincial party leaders, such as deputy party secretary of Jilin
Province Lin Yanzhi, had already spoken out against Jiang's scheme.3
Zhang Dejiang, party secretary of Zhejiang Provincial Committee of
the CCP, had also strongly argued that private entrepreneurs should
not be allowed to join the CCP.4  Zhejiang is among the few provinces in
China where the private sector has made rapid inroads and has played
an increasingly important role in the local economy and even politics.
Zhang's strong opposition suggested that there was no consensus within
the party leadership on the political role of the private sector. Indeed,
the arguments presented by Lin and Zhang are representative of and
are popular among old-style leftists. In brief, apart from being accused
of breaching the party's cardinal principle by courting members of the
exploitative class, Jiang was blamed for his failure to address the burn-
ing issues of growing unemployment and widening income dispari-
ties, and his failure to hold formal consultations within the party before
making the announcement.
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In response, Jiang quickly ordered the closure of the two 'theoretical'
(i.e. ideological) magazines, Zhenli de zhuiqiu [Seeking Truth] and
Zhongliu [The Central Pillar], which were well-known mouthpieces of
the leftists.5  Subsequently, some leftist websites were also shut down.6
Since then party cadres throughout China, including officers of the PLA,
have been instructed to hold study sessions of Jiang's 'July 1 Speech.'7
Not too long ago, the CCP had continued to proclaim that its ulti-
mate goal was to eliminate capitalism; and all forms of politically and
ideologically incorrect 'elements' such as 'private entrepreneurs' or capi-
talists were not allowed to exist in the party. Although it is still not
certain today what political role the rising new capitalist class will play,
the party seems to have begun its transformation from traditional Marx-
ism and Leninism to something else. This paper attempts to examine
this transformation by employing the concept 'interest' based on Albert
Hirschman's definition. The paper is divided into sections. The first
section discusses the concept 'interest.' The second section examines
the rise of an interest-based social order and its impact on Chinese poli-
tics. The third section highlights how the party leadership has adjusted
the party to accommodate a rising interest-based social order. Finally, I
shall discuss what difficulties lie ahead in the process of transformation.
'Interest'
'Interest' has been a fundamental force that motivates the action of the
actor. The concept of 'interest' used here is drawn largely from
Hirschman's definition.8  'Interest' motivates action, but actors define
'interest' differently, including interest in honour, glory, self-respect, in
an afterlife, in economic advantage, etc.9  Regardless of the various defi-
nitions of 'interest,' this paper regards 'interest' as a 'methodical pursuit
and accumulation of private wealth.'10  According to Hirschman, an in-
terest-propelled action is characterized by self-centredness, that is, 'predomi-
nant attention of the actor to the consequences of any contemplated action
for himself,' and rational calculation, that is, 'a systematic attempt at evalu-
ating prospective costs, benefits, satisfactions, and the like.'11
There are political benefits of an interest-based social order. First of
all, an interest-based social order is more governable than one based on
other non-interest-based factors, such as various forms of passion, since
interest-guided individual behaviour is more predictable than a pas-
sion-guided act. As Hirschman noted, 'A world where people methodi-
cally pursue their private interests was … far more predictable, and
hence more governable, than one where the citizens are vying with each
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other for honor and glory' (emphasis original).12  Second, in an interest-
based social order, individual behaviour is expected to be stable and
continuous. When individuals pursue 'single-mindedly material inter-
ests,' their behaviour will not experience any turbulent change.
Third, economic expansion and the coming of an interest-based social
order can make individual behaviour increasingly peaceful. In what
Hirschman called the French thesis of the doux commerce, 'commerce was
often regarded as a powerful civilizing agent diffusing prudence, probity,
and similar virtues within and among trading societies.'13 This theme was
expressed by Montesquieu in the Spirit of Laws when he declared,
 [I]t is almost a general rule that wherever manners are gentle there is commerce;
and wherever there is commerce, manners are gentle. [C]ommerce … polishes
and softens barbaric ways as we can see everyday.14
Fourth and even more relevant to this paper, the principle of doux
commerce is applicable not only to democracy, but also to other types of
regime such as monarchy and despotism. Economic expansion can sof-
ten a regime's use of coercion. It can even lead to regime changes by
eliminating arbitrary and authoritarian decision-making by the sover-
eign. For Montesquieu, with the rise of specific new economic institu-
tions resulting from economic expansion, the state will be largely de-
prived of its traditional power such as the power 'to seize property and
to debase the currency at will.' For Steuart, 'it is rather the overall com-
plexity and vulnerability of the 'modern economy' that make arbitrary
decisions and interferences unthinkable – that is, exorbitantly costly
and disruptive.'15  Furthermore, economic expansion can also empower
the people. According to Millar, the advance of commerce and manu-
facturing gives rise to a general diffusion of the spirit of liberty. This is
so because it enhances the ability of certain social groups to resort to
collective action against oppression and mismanagement.16
Finally, many scholars have argued that the economic benefits from
economic expansion will make the state soften its rule over economic
activities and respect people's basic economic freedom. Smith argued
that economic expansion and individuals' pursuit of wealth and inter-
est could lead to a spontaneous social order. According to him, market
exchange can produce a 'natural progress of things toward improve-
ment' because it induces individuals to consume and produce in ra-
tional ways. Free market exchange thus can ensure that the consumer is
'led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention.'17  In other words, the market generates a 'public interest' that
encompasses national wealth, a non-coercive society, and the freedom
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to choose and co-operate that emerges when individuals have the op-
tion and incentive to make rational choices.18
The logic behind the transformation of the CCP is based on the simple no-
tion of preserving its 'interest.' It is all these advantages of 'interest' defined
above that have led the Chinese leadership to justify a market economy and
capitalistic development and allow capitalists to join the party.
From 'Ideology' to 'Interest'
In the pre-reform era, China can be regarded as an ideologically and
politically constructed society based on the concept of 'class.' It was
organized in accordance with major political leaders' perceptions of what
a society should be and realized by forceful organizational weapons.
As Schurmann correctly pointed out in the 1960s, 'Communist China is
like a vast building made of different kinds of brick and stone. How-
ever it was put together, it stands. What holds it together is ideology
and organization.'19
The leadership under Mao Zedong initiated various political experi-
ments, especially during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, to
reorganize China, according to Mao's own utopian ideals of what soci-
ety should be like. Whatever Mao did, his aim was to destroy all possi-
ble private space and politicize the Chinese society. Totalitarian state
power penetrated every corner of society and coercive institutional mecha-
nisms were used to eliminate private space and manage public space.20
The household registration (hukou) system was used to control popu-
lation movement and bind people to their place of birth and work. Since
without a household registration booklet, no one could obtain food,
clothing, housing, employment, schooling for children or the right to
marry or enlist in the army, the system created a spatial hierarchy of
urban places, priority of urban over rural areas, and where large cities
took precedence over smaller ones in terms of the allocation of state
resources.21  A related institution for controlling population was the work
unit (danwei) system, in which the party-state implemented ideological
indoctrination and administrative disciplining such as warning, public
criticism and negative records in the dossier.22  The danwei system was
also a mechanism in which the party-state solicited political compliance
and allegiance from individual citizens by providing them with economic
and social security such as inexpensive housing, free medical care, gener-
ous retirement pensions, and a wide range of subsidies covering virtually
every household need from transportation to nutrition.
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 16 • 200262
Zheng Yongnian
Furthermore, enormous mass organizations were created in order to
mobilize millions of people to implement public policies, and to achieve
the party's and even Mao's personal purposes. All these organizations
were administrated and monitored by the party-state and were used to
organize youths, workers, women and other social groups into bodies
resembling 'a conscription society.'23  Meanwhile, the party-state banned
all functional organizations, which were regarded or even suspected to
be 'counter-revolutionary.' All autonomous and independent organiza-
tions were prohibited.
A highly organized and politicized society, together with a planned
economy, enabled the party-state to mobilize numerous social groups
into the political arena, and thus created new power resources within
the Chinese society to implement profound tasks of social engineering
such as land reform, collectivization and nationalization of business
and commerce. Nevertheless, over time, the reach of the party-state was
shortened. As Shue has pointed out, the highly organized and effica-
cious party-state gradually degenerated into a regime obsessed with
ideology and lacking almost any genuine social base beyond its party-
state apparatus. No wonder then that it becomes increasingly difficult
to govern either legitimately or effectively.24
In the late 1970s, the Deng Xiaoping leadership began to shift its
emphasis to economics as a way of reorganizing the country.25  In the
1980s, China achieved high rates of economic growth by expanding its
market space.26  But it was only after Deng's southern tour (nanxun) in
1992 that the Chinese leadership legitimized capitalism as a way of pro-
moting economic expansion.
Why was the CCP not able to legitimize capitalism in the 1980s? Capi-
talism could have been legitimized in that period. After the bitter and
uncertain 30 years of experimentation following 1949, many leaders
realized that learning from capitalism conforms to historical necessity,
and capitalism is a stage that cannot be skipped on the way to social-
ism. Although the party had an idea of the nineteenth-century capital-
ism from which Marx drew inspiration, the reform and open-door policy
enabled party cadres and government officials to see what had hap-
pened to capitalism recently from China's neighbouring countries, es-
pecially the four little dragons, i.e., Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and
South Korea, in addition to Japan and the United States. From all these
countries, the leadership saw how capitalism had helped raise the stand-
ard of living of the vast majority of the people there, and enhanced
their status in international arenas, which were goals that the CCP had
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fought for since its establishment. The impact of the four little dragons
on China's leaders should not be underestimated since the experiences
of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore showed that Chinese culture was
not a barrier but a catalyst to economic growth.27  The leaders realized
what was important was not cultural but institutional factors, and if
the country wanted to achieve rapid economic growth, its economic
system had to be overhauled. This was the motivation behind the deci-
sion of the leadership to implement economic reforms. Many social
groups, especially young intellectuals, advocated publicly for capital-
ism, genuinely believing that capitalism could pave the way for China
to grow into a strong and affluent nation. Spurring the country on was
the capitalist West, which was quite friendly to China in the 1980s, as
they believed China's market-oriented economic reform and open-door
policy would eventually lead to two transformations, that is, from a
planned economy to a free market system, and from political authori-
tarianism to democracy.
However, in that decade, the Chinese revolutionary leaders had quite
different perceptions of the market economy and capitalism.28  While at
the practical level they did not oppose carrying out different forms of
capitalistic experiment, ideologically, they were unwilling to legitimize
capitalism.29  It was only after they saw that market economy did not
harm the socialist system which they had fought for that they became
willing to recognize its legitimacy. This can be seen from changes in the
official definition of China's economic system. At the CCP's 12th Con-
gress in 1982, the leadership defined the country's economic system as
one in which the 'planned economy is the main pillar and market
economy a supplementary element.' The market economy failed to gain
theoretical legitimacy then. Five years later in 1987, at the 13th Con-
gress, the leadership defined the economic system as one 'combining
planned and market economies'; and here the market economy gained
an ideological status equal to that of the planned economy. However,
with the coming and in the aftermath of the 1989 pro-democracy move-
ment, capitalism came under serious attack. Conservative leaders re-
garded the pro-democracy movement as the result of the spread of capi-
talism as an idea and as a practice.30
Why then did a sudden change take place after Deng Xiaoping's
nanxun? Two important and subtle factors can be identified. First, the
political interests of the regime were reconstructed in the early 1990s.
Second, the reconstruction of political interests created an ideological
room for capitalism as a way to reorganize society. In the early 1990s, a
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serious political legitimacy crisis hit the CCP, following the crackdown
of the 1989 pro-democracy movement and the collapse of communism
in the Soviet Union and East European countries. Initially, regime sur-
vival became the highest priority, and consequently, the leadership tight-
ened its control by engaging in both political and economic rectifica-
tion. Nevertheless, Chinese leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, also re-
alized that the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of East Euro-
pean communism was mainly due to the failure of economic develop-
ment there. Therefore, the party needed to achieve radical economic growth
if it wanted to avoid such a misfortune and rebuild its political legitimacy.
Deng Xiaoping chose the path of initiating radical economic reforms.31
While the leadership decided to implement radical economic reform,
it also began to build a new social order in accordance with the capital-
ist economic changes. Although the leadership tightened its political
control in the aftermath of the 1989 movement, social demands for po-
litical reform were still prevalent. In order to transform popular pas-
sions for political interests to those for economic interests, the leader-
ship had to provide social members with an economic 'exit.' While the
crackdown of the 1989 movement showed social members the high cost
of pursuing political interests, the opening of an economic 'exit' led them
to realize that the shift from political interests to economic interests
would be beneficial. In Hirschman's term, this is a strategy to trans-
form people's 'public action' (demands for political reform) to 'private
interest' (economic activities).32  The political significance of such an
economic 'exit' motivated the leadership to de-ideologize capitalism as
a means of economic expansion. This strategy resulted in almost a dec-
ade of rapid development and socio-political stability.
A Rising Interest-based Social Order
An interest-based social order is not a natural result of economic ex-
pansion, but was consciously pursued by the party leadership. What
the leadership wants is not only economic expansion per se, but also the
beneficial political consequences arising from rapid economic expan-
sion. Economic expansion has generated enormous political benefits,
not only because it has increased the regime's political legitimacy, but
also because it has changed the space structure in the country. The con-
scious pursuit of economic expansion has led to the emergence of an
interest-based social order,33  which in turn has resulted in the creation
and expansion of a private arena.34
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The rapid expansion of the private space is reflected in the decline of
the state sector and the development of the non-state sector, as shown
in Tables 1 and 2. From Table 1, we can see that the gross industrial
output by the state-owned enterprises declined from 55 percent in 1990
to 27 percent in 1998, while that by individually owned enterprises in-
creased from 5 percent to 16 percent during the same period. The non-
state sector has overwhelmingly surpassed the state sector.
Table 3 shows the economic significance of the private sector. The private
sector consumed 4 percent of the total retail sales in 1996, and the figure in-
creased to 13.5 percent in 1999. During the same period, the industrial and
commercial taxes paid by the private sector in national total increased from 1
percent to 2.6 percent. The private sector has become even more important in
revenue contribution at local levels. According to one calculation, as of the mid-
1990s, the private sector had contributed about 10 percent of the total tax rev-
enue at the provincial level, 20 percent at the prefectural level, and 30 percent at
the county level.35  For instance, in 1996, the private sector in Zhejiang contrib-
uted 4.4 billion yuan industrial and commercial taxes, or 13.4 percent of the
total industrial and commercial taxes in that province. In some rich areas, the
private sector contributes township revenue as high as 60 percent.36
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to point out that while the private sector has
become increasingly important, its motivation to pay tax revenue to the state is
low. Table 3 shows that in 1999, the private sector consumed 13.5 percent of
retail sales of consumer goods, but its revenue contribution to the total indus-
trial and commercial taxes was only 2.6 percent. Low incentive to contribute
revenue is also reflected in Table 4. From 1986 to 1992, revenue contribution by
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the private sector was largely in accordance with its share of the total national
industrial output. After 1992, the gap between the two widened dramatically.
For instance, in 1998, while the private sector contributed only 7 per-
cent of the total national budgetary revenue, it accounted for more than
17 percent of the total industrial output.37
The rapid expansion of private space has undermined, or even de-
stroyed, the old ideologically constructed social order. The household
registration system has faced gradual erosion since the introduction of
a market economy in the 1980s. With basic daily necessities available
through the market, the state was no longer able effectively to control
population movement from rural to urban areas, from interior to coastal
areas, and from small to large cities. The system was further under-
mined by intensive economic competition among regions. To attract
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talented people, many cities have substantially relaxed the original reg-
istrations required for the employment of non-local residents.38
In Russia and some other East European communist states, the col-
lapse of the ideologically constructed social order had resulted in socio-
economic chaos. But this is not the case in China. The creation and ex-
pansion of a private arena is what distinguishes China from the fate of
the other communist states. Although the expanding private space is
confined to the non-political arena, it is politically significant. First of
all, it provides social members with an 'exit' from the public arena. With-
out such a private exit, social members would have to struggle for what
they want in a highly politicized public arena. Since there was no pri-
vate arena, they would have to fight to win in this public arena; other-
wise, they would lose everything. This would undoubtedly intensify
political conflicts among social members. Therefore, the expansion of a
private arena reduces greatly the intensity of political conflicts, and thus
the political burden of the party and the government.
Second, the existence of a private arena makes it possible for citizens
to remain apolitical, if they do not want to be involved in politics. In an
ideologically constructed society, political indifference is possible, but
politically risky. Since all economic benefits are distributed through
political means, social members had to engage in politics. In contrast,
an interest-based social order not only allows people to pay less atten-
tion to politics, but also encourages them to devote themselves whole-
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heartedly to economic activities. In other words, political indifference
is no longer risky, and politically indifferent citizens can obtain their
basic necessities through the market.
Third, with the dawn of an interest-based social order, China's eco-
nomic development has gained a spontaneous and natural momentum.
In an ideologically constructed social order, any political change would
inevitably affect economic activities. But in an interest-based social or-
der, economic activities are less affected by political changes. An inter-
est-based social order has an inherent capability to resist the impact of
political changes. Government intervention in economic activities is
reduced, but economic development continues. This in turn increases
the legitimacy of the government, though it is now less responsible for
economic development.
Political Order Affected
The rise of an interest-based social order is beneficial for the legitimacy
of the party-state at an early stage. Nonetheless, a continuously expand-
ing social order has come to produce enormous unexpected political
consequences that affect the existing political order. In other words, an
interest-based social order has gradually undermined the existing po-
litical order and thus created pressure for interest representation.
With rapid economic expansion, the private arena has become more
profitable than the public arena. The nascent interest-based social order
has thus attracted not only social members, but also party cadres and
government officials. This is especially true in the period after Deng
Xiaoping's southern tour. Party cadres and government officials were
allowed, even encouraged, by the reformist leadership to turn to busi-
ness. This soon resulted in a nationwide wave of xiahai (literally 'plung-
ing into the sea').39  As shown in Table 5, in 1992, party cadres and gov-
ernment officials were the second largest group (25.5 percent) who es-
tablished private businesses, following household-business owners (38.2
percent). By the mid-1990s, as shown in Table 6, they had become the
largest group in private enterprises.
By encouraging party cadres and government officials to turn to busi-
ness, the party leadership aimed to reduce their political resistance to
radical economic reforms. To a great degree, this goal was realized. But
it was achieved at great costs. First of all, many talents 'exited' from the
state to the private arena, especially those who had promoted China's
market reform. Since they had been involved in new forms of economic
activities, they were more knowledgeable than others on how to make
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profits through an emerging market. Such an 'exit' indeed weakened
the reformist forces in the country. Second, party cadres and government
officials were given opportunities to utilize their public power to gain pri-
vate economic benefits. For example, party cadres and government offi-
cials have attempted to build up their connections (guanxi) with the pri-
vate sector. In a survey conducted in 1993, when private entrepreneurs
were asked to name their closest friends, the distribution was as follows:
professionals (16.6 percent), cadres in the government sector (24.4 percent);
cadres in SOEs (18 percent), workers (1.3 percent), farmers (3.7 percent),
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specialized artisans (6.4 percent), staff in the service sector (9.5 percent),
and small enterprise owners (8.9), and others (2.9).40  According to the
study, to build their connections with the private sector, party cadres and
government officials aimed to: (a) gain economic benefits for themselves
and their family members; (b) search for opportunities to xiahai, i.e., to
leave the government sector and turn to business; and (c) seek political
support from the private sector due to its increasing political importance.41
When public power is used for economic benefits, corruption becomes
inevitable and increasingly serious. While in the old days political loy-
alty was the most important standard used to evaluate the political
achievements of party cadres and government officials, 'money' has now
come to replace political loyalty. Corruption has undermined not only
the effectiveness of the government, but also popular confidence in the
government. Shoring up political legitimacy has thus become once again
a serious challenge for the party and the government.
The Chinese state has played an extremely important role in pushing
the process of economic transformation. But the close linkages between
the government and businesses have led to widespread corruption
among party cadres and government officials. Corruption has become
increasingly serious since the early 1990s, as shown in Table 7. Between
1993 and 2000, the number of cases investigated and handled by disci-
pline inspection and procuratorial organs throughout the country in-
creased 9 percent annually, and the number of officials given party and
administrative disciplinary punishments went up 12 percent. Between
1990 and 1998, procuratorial organs nationwide accepted and handled more
than 1.1 million corruption cases, of which over 500,000 cases were placed
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on file for investigation and prosecution. More than 600,000 offenders were
involved.42  From January to August 2000 alone, the procuratorates through-
out the country prosecuted 23,464 criminal cases involving graft and em-
bezzlement.43  The 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency In-
ternational ranked China as 63rd among 90 countries.44
Since the early 1990s, the Chinese state has initiated a series of anti-
corruption measures. Nevertheless, corruption is still rampant. Even
Premier Zhu Rongji had to admit, in his Work Report to the National
People's Congress in March 2000, that 'the emergence and spread of
corruption and undesirable practices have not been brought under con-
trol.'45  Corruption has caused social and political instability.  It also
aroused people's ire against the party's inability to ensure fairness and
cast doubts on its legitimacy to rule the country.
All these economic and social problems have further eroded social mo-
rale. Ordinary citizens see the abundance of wealth and greed of party
cadres and government officials, and find it difficult to rationalize why
they should hold back. Gradually, they no longer regard the system in
which they live as being fair to them. Meanwhile, government officials at
different levels have also found that it is increasingly difficult to maintain
a sense of morality and social community among both urban and rural
residents. Moreover, as corruption becomes rampant among party cadres
and government officials, crime has also become widespread among ordi-
nary citizens.46  Robbery and armed assault, which were unthinkable dur-
ing Mao's time, have become a part of daily life.
Various surveys show that since the early 1990s, 'serious corruption com-
mitted by government officials' and 'public disorder' were among the is-
sues of concern among ordinary citizens in China.47  When the govern-
ment becomes corrupt and public order becomes problematic, people tend
to become discontented and anxious. According to a 1998 survey, nearly
93 percent of the respondents did not regard China as a country ruled by
law. When asked what they would do if conflict or disputes with others
occurred, 74.7 percent indicated that they would turn to legal means for a
resolution. Nevertheless, they also believed that such means would be in-
effective since power was still above the law in China, so they would ap-
peal through other non-legal means. About 49 percent said that they would
seek help from the media, and 24.7 percent would turn to individual lead-
ers. Furthermore, about 16 percent of the people would turn to some form
of collective action for justice such as petition, demonstration, and collec-
tive visit to higher authorities for their intervention (shang fang).48
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The most serious threat is that the party is increasingly facing pres-
sure to incorporate newly rising social forces into its political order. The
nascent social order has a strong justification to request that its voice be
heard since government policies have an impact on its rise and fall.
Table 8 shows the results of two nationwide surveys conducted in 1995
and 1997 respectively. We can see that taxation policy, credit policy, gov-
ernment macro-economic adjustment, and industrial and commercial
management, among others, have been the most important political
factors affecting their business activities. More and more, private
businesspeople expect to participate in policy-making or at least have
some input in policy-making. Moreover, the private sector has been
affected not only by relevant government policies, but also by various
forms of social and political practices prevalent in China. As shown in
Table 9, 'exchange between power and money,' 'worsening public or-
der' and 'arbitrary collection of fees, fines and levies' have been regarded
as the factors that have had the most serious impact on private busi-
nesses. To change such social and political practices is no easy task and
would require the political participation of private business persons.
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Indeed, private entrepreneurs have been making great efforts to par-
ticipate in the political process, especially in local politics. No system-
atic national statistics are available to show the degree of political par-
ticipation by private businesspeople. But as shown in Table 10, a rapid
expansion of their involvement in local politics took place in the early
1990s. According to a survey conducted in 1993, on average, each pri-
vate entrepreneur had membership in 2.75 organizations such as pri-
vate enterprise associations, guilds, different democratic parties, Youth
League, and even the Chinese Communist Party. Almost 84 percent of
private entrepreneurs argued that it was imperative to establish their
own organizations.49  Another means for private entrepreneurs to influ-
ence China's political process was for them to join the CCP. According
to various surveys, more and more private entrepreneurs have become
party members. In 1993, among all private entrepreneurs, 13 percent
were CCP members, and this figure was 17 percent in 1995, and 16.6
percent in 1997. In 2000, this figure increased to almost 20 percent, far
higher than other social groups such as workers and farmers.50
Political participation by private entrepreneurs is still extremely limited
at the national level. For example, only 46 out of more than 2,000 repre-
sentatives of the 9th Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
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(CPPCC) in 1998 were private businesspeople.51  A low degree of political
participation indeed has caused dissatisfaction among this sector. As shown
in Table 11, while self-evaluation by private businesspeople about their
economic and social status has been consistent, that of their political status
has deteriorated. It is worthwhile to note that their self-evaluation for po-
litical status was lowest in 1997, the year the private sector was formally
legalized by China's Constitution.52
Accommodation and Representation
The response of the CCP is to co-opt rising social forces into the regime.
Since the southern tour, the new leadership has made great efforts not
only to legitimize and institutionalize the emerging interest-based so-
cial order, but also to search for a proper political order which will be
compatible with this emerging social order. While the party-state has
attempted, albeit without success, to incorporate some social groups
into the regime, it still remains intolerant of any direct democratic chal-
lenge, which became apparent towards the end of the 1990s, as exem-
plified by the attempts of Chinese pro-democracy activists to organize
an opposition party. In the last few months of 1998, the preparatory
committees of China's Democracy Party were established in 23 out of
China's 31 provinces and major cities. Applications to register the new
party were made in 14 provinces and cities.53  As long as the party-state
'refuses' to address the democratic challenge head-on, it will stay irrel-
evant to newly emerging democratic forces. The CCP leadership is intol-
erant of direct political challenges mounted by social groups, but attempts
have been made to accommodate newly rising social forces. This can be
shown by changes introduced into the country's Constitution.
Constitutional changes in China could mean two things, first, a re-
placement of the existing constitution with a new one (1954-82), and
second,  making amendments to the Constitution (1982-99). When the
political situation changes, the old Constitution is likely to be replaced
by a new one. Thus the 1975 Constitution is called the 'Cultural Revolu-
tion Constitution,' the 1978 Constitution the 'Four-Modernization Consti-
tution,' and the 1982 Constitution the 'Reform and Open-Door Constitu-
tion.' Similarly, each revision of the Constitution was motivated by strong
political concerns and heavily influenced by the leadership's intention to
adjust the political system to changing situations. It is worthwhile to briefly
examine the constitutional changes related to the private sector.
According to the 1954 Constitution, the first one in the history of Peo-
ple's Republic, China's political system was led by the working class as
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its leading class and the worker-peasant alliance as its foundation (Ar-
ticle 1). Regarding the economic system, the Constitution decreed that
the state would aim at eliminating the exploitative system and building
a socialist system. While the state sector should be in a dominant posi-
tion, other sectors such as collective cooperatives, individually owned
enterprises, private capitalist economy, and state capitalism were al-
lowed to co-exist (Articles 5 and 10). Furthermore, the Constitution also
provided protection to citizens' ownership of legal incomes, savings,
properties and other forms of productive materials (Article 11), and
protection to the right of inheritance of private properties (Article 12).
Meanwhile, the state would collect and even confiscate land and other
forms of productive materials in accordance with laws and regulations
in order to meet the needs of public interests (Article 13), and everyone
was prohibited from utilizing his/her private properties to undermine
public interests (Article 14). The Constitution also declared that public
properties were sacred and inviolable, and it was every citizen's duty
to protect public properties (Article 101).
Many waves of political movements such as the Anti-Rightist Move-
ment and the Cultural Revolution almost completely nullified the 1954
Constitution. In 1975, the party leadership under the 'Gang of Four'
drew up a new Constitution. The 1975 Constitution formally nullified
many articles regarding citizens' rights in the 1954 Constitution, and
added some articles to meet the political needs of that time. To support
the party became the citizens' rights, although citizens were also granted
the right to rebel. The revised Constitution was reduced to 30 articles
from the original 106.
After the death of Mao Zedong and the overthrow of the Gang of
Four in 1976, the CCP leadership under Hua Guofeng decided to make
a constitutional revision in 1978. Though the Constitution was expanded
to 60 articles by restoring some articles of the 1954 Constitution, it was
still based on the 1975 Constitution. In accordance with political changes
in train at that time, the use of material incentives to promote the four-
modernizations was legalized.
After Deng Xiaoping returned to power, the CCP leadership passed an en-
tirely new constitution, i.e., the 1982 Constitution. The new Constitution re-
stored almost all the articles of the 1954 Constitution. New ones were added
(from 106 articles in 1954 to 138) to meet new political and economic needs.
Though the 1982 Constitution still emphasized that the state sector had to be
dominant in China's economy, it recognized that individually engaged eco-
nomic activities in both rural and urban areas were complementary to the state
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sector (Article 11). What was later called the private enterprise (which em-
ployed more than eight workers) was not legalized.
In 1988, the first constitutional amendment was made. Two signifi-
cant changes were made regarding China's economic system. First, one
paragraph was added to Article 11:
The state allows the private economy to exist and develop within the legal
boundary. The private economy is a complement to the socialist public economy.
The state protects legal rights and interests of the private economy, provides it
with leadership, supervision and management (Article 11, para. 3).
Second, para. 4 of Article 10 was revised: The state recognized that
'land use right can be transferred in accordance with legal regulations.'
This change was significant since it meant that the state legalized em-
ployment, capital accumulation, land commercialization and other
newly rising economic activities. Five years later, in 1993, the second
constitutional amendment was made. The 1993 amendment gave up
the planned economic system, and formally declared that a socialist
market economy was to be established.
The official confirmation of the market economy led to serious criti-
cisms against capitalistic development by the Leftists, both old and new,
in the mid-1990s. Despite controversies, the leadership decided to press
on. The 15th Party Congress in 1997 further pointed to how a market
economy could be rooted in China, and declared a programme of par-
tial privatization of state-owned enterprises. Further, based on the 1993
amendment, the Second Session of the 9th National People's Congress
(NPC) in 1999 made a constitutional amendment, which, for the first
time since the establishment of the People's Republic, provided consti-
tutional protection for the private economy.54
While it will take a long time for the CCP to establish an interest-
based political order, all these constitutional changes in the 1990s show
that the party leadership has made great efforts to adjust China's politi-
cal system not only to promote further economic development, but also
to accommodate capitalist economic institutions. In February 2000, Jiang
Zemin raised a new concept of sange daibiao (literally 'Three Represen-
tations'). According to this concept, the CCP represents the 'most ad-
vanced mode of productive force, the most advanced culture, and the
interests of the majority of the population.'55  The 'Three Representa-
tions' theory is undoubtedly the clearest sign yet of the CCP's affirma-
tion of the non-state sector in the economy. More importantly, it also
shows that the CCP has begun to consider how the interests of newly
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rising classes or social groups can be represented. As discussed at the
beginning of this paper, the CCP leadership has also legitimized party
membership of private entrepreneurs or capitalists. All these changes
have been warmly received by the private sector, and are widely re-
garded as a symbol of the CCP's transformation from a communist party
to one containing some social democratic elements.
Transformation and Political risks
What the CCP has done provides clear indications that the party is jet-
tisoning its past ideological rigidity by willingly embracing rising eco-
nomic and social elites. The party's initiative is apparently motivated
by pragmatic political considerations. First, admitting private entrepre-
neurs is a means for the party to adapt itself to China's changing politi-
cal and social realities. As mentioned earlier, many private entrepre-
neurs are already party members. What the party leadership proposes
to do today is formally to endorse their party membership while allow-
ing others to join as new members. Second, by so doing, the leadership
wants to expand the party's social base in order to revitalize itself. Over
the years, the capitalist mode of economic development has radically
changed China's class structure. With the decline of the political and
ideological importance of workers and peasants, the party has to em-
brace the rising new elites, from industrialists and international busi-
nessmen to property magnates and 'dotcom' venture capitalists, in or-
der to stay socially relevant. China today has 60 million registered stock
and share buyers, roughly equal to the total party membership.
Politically, the party's initiative to embrace these new social elites or
new economic interest groups is clearly calculated to bolster its one-
party domination. Mao could depend on class struggle and mass move-
ments to govern China, and he could count on the support of millions
of poor peasants and workers. China was then a backward agricultural
economy, with peasants accounting for 80 percent of the total labour
force. Today, China is a growing industrial economy, with peasants con-
stituting less than 50 percent of the labour force and many of them not
even full-time farmers.
Specifically, the party leadership simply cannot rule China today by
mass political mobilization as Mao once did, since the party's original
power base has fast eroded. China is rapidly developing into a modern
society, with 130 million hand-phones and close to 30 million Internet
users. The economy is increasingly integrated with international capi-
talism on account of China's growing foreign trade, foreign investment
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and foreign tourism. The populace is also becoming increasingly liter-
ate, especially in urban areas.
Furthermore, state governance in China is not yet highly institution-
alized, and the rule of law not firmly rooted. For the party effectively to
rule such a vast and diverse country without sound democratic foun-
dations, it is all the more crucial for the party leadership to build up a
broad social consensus and a coalition of various interests. Clearly, the
party cannot exclude the 'outstanding elements' of society from the pri-
vate sector. For China's emerging political order to remain viable, the
party has to be socially more broad-based.
However, the party will have to bear some long-term costs for admit-
ting capitalists and professionals. Leftist critics have warned that the
recruitment of the bourgeoisie into the party will inevitably create more
corruption in the party, making it easier for the 'money for power' phe-
nomenon to take place. Some critics have even suggested that capital-
ists may eventually take over the party's leadership.56
This is actually already happening in many party branches in the rural
areas where businessmen are reported to have used their financial power
to manipulate local elections or simply take over local party branches. Suf-
fice it to say that with capitalists inside the party, they will certainly act as
potential catalysts to quicken the transformation of the party. Judging by
the way Chinese society is evolving, there is a real possibility that the party,
in admitting capitalists, has also let in the Trojan horse.
This top-down transformation is not without any political risks. The
most serious challenge for the CCP is to determine whose interests it
should represent. During Mao Zedong's time, the CCP was genuinely a
revolutionary party with its members drawn overwhelmingly from
workers and peasants, who constituted 83 percent of the total member-
ship in 1956. But this figure dropped to 52 percent in 1994.57  After his
return to power, Deng started what may be called a 'technocratic move-
ment,' replacing revolutionary cadres in party leadership positions with
technocrats, with an essential proportion increasingly coming from the
non-state sector.58  When the party associates itself with capitalists, work-
ers and farmers tend to feel alienated. Scholars have found that SOE
workers and rural farmers are rapidly becoming the two biggest losers
of capitalistic development.59  Rapidly growing new leftists are fearful
that the party might favour these new entrepreneur-members at the ex-
pense of its traditional clients, i.e., workers and farmers. While in the past
the party protected the workers, the present may see the party colluding
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with the entrepreneur to clamp down on the workers. They argue that
being wealthier and wielding greater influence, these capitalists would
exert an unhealthy bias in the formulation of party policies. Worse, the
close links between the CCP and the capitalists would breed new types of
cronyism and corruption. New leftists thus have called on workers and
farmers with democratic mechanisms to articulate their interests.
Can 'Voice' Mechanisms be Established?
So, the key question is:  What choices does the party-state face in trans-
forming itself into a democratic mechanism? This question can be an-
swered in different ways, but in terms of the representation of class
interests, three options can be identified.
Multi-party system
This is the alternative that most scholars have called for. It has been argued
that democracy means a multi-party system. Without political competi-
tion among parties, there will be no democracy. For the CCP, this choice is
to have parties outside the party (dangwai youdang). Demands for estab-
lishing opposition parties were there and became apparent towards the
end of the 1990s, as exemplified by the attempt of Chinese pro-democracy
activists to organize an opposition party. In a few months of 1998, the pre-
paratory committees of China's Democracy Party were established in 23
out of China's 31 provinces and major cities. Applications to register the
new party were made in 14 provinces and cities.60
The unfolding of this event also shows that different opinions ex-
isted among CCP leaders regarding opposition parties. A multi-party
system undoubtedly is ideal, but realistically speaking, it is less likely.
Except for dissidents inside and outside China, the majority of the popu-
lation are not demanding a multi-party system. Democratization char-
acterized by the emergence of a multi-party system in Russia, Taiwan
and Indonesia has not enabled the regimes there to improve people's
living standards. Instead, social decay and economic chaos have be-
come prevalent there. The majority is more likely to choose other alter-
natives, if they exist. Furthermore, the party-state favours a top-down
approach. The leadership is intolerant of direct political challenges
mounted by social groups, although attempts have been made to ac-
commodate newly rising social groups. To a great degree, democracy is
not an option decided by social groups.
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Factional politics within the party
More feasible than a multi-party system is the option to legitimize and
institutionalize factions within the party (dangnei youpai). Like elsewhere,
factions existed within the CCP. Even under Maoist coercive rule, fac-
tional struggles never disappeared among top leaders. Certainly, un-
der Mao, factions were unlikely to be institutionalized. Since the pass-
ing of the Deng-centred generation leadership, factional politics has been
institutionalized to some degree and many organization-based factions
have been formed, such as the party, the National People's Congress
and the State Council. Other factions have also co-existed such as the
Shanghai Clique, the Qinghua Clique (those who graduated from Qinghua
University), the Tuanpai (officials related to the Communist Youth League),
the Taizidang (the princelings), and so forth. These factions have their own
interests and identity, their own ways for interest articulation.
All these factions will not help in establishing 'voice' mechanisms for
different social groups. To materialize interest articulation, the leader-
ship has, first, to legalize factional politics, and second, to address class
interests. Without the legitimization of factional politics, factional com-
petition can only be engaged informally. The legitimization and institu-
tionalization of factions help make the political process transparent.
Social classes therefore will be able to identify their interests with cer-
tain factions. Certainly, more important is that the party has to allow
different factions to represent the interests of different social classes.
Organization-based factions only represent the interests of these organiza-
tions, not those of the social classes. Once factions are legitimized, these
factions will appeal to different social classes in their competition for po-
litical power. Power competition will further push the party to establish
inter-party democratic mechanisms since without such mechanisms, the
party will fall apart. While factions enable the party to represent different
social interests, inter-party democracy enables the party to remain united.
Reforming the existing system
The most feasible but less effective option in representing different so-
cial interests is to reform the existing political system. The Chinese po-
litical system is not without any advantages. The problem is that the
leadership never considers the issue of interest representation. Many
mechanisms are actually available for interest representation. Among
others, three reforms have to be made. First, the People's Congress is
the most feasible mechanism for different social classes to articulate
their interests. To achieve this goal, reforms have to be introduced to
transform the People's Congress into a real institution for people's rep-
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resentatives. Needless to say, people's representatives have to be se-
lected and elected by people.61
Second, the People's Consultative Conference (PCC) system has to
be re-organized and indeed re-politicized. Before the People's Congress
was established in 1954, the PCC played an important political role in
representing the interests of different political parties and functional
groups. China did not have a multi-party system after 1949. The PCC,
instead of political parties, played the role of interest articulation and
integration. This model used to inspire the first Indonesian President
Sukarno in designing Indonesia's political system. In order to avoid
political chaos and instability caused by intensive competition among
enormous parties, Indonesia established GOLKAR (functional groups)
for interest articulation and representation.62  In China, after 1954, the
PCC was sidelined. Even after the reform began, the PCC is still an
institution for retired government officials and social elites. Today, the
PCC is only a forum for these representatives: it has the right to discuss
the issues, but no right to vote. To a great degree, it is a political organi-
zation without any political significance. To revive the PCC, it has to be
granted the right to vote. Furthermore, it has to go back to its previous
role of representing different functional groups (social interests). Its re-
lationship with the People's Congress has also to be sorted out.
Third, at the next level, civil society and social organizations have to
adjust their functions. Throughout the reform period, social groups have
mushroomed.63  But at present, all those social organizations are not
able to aggregate and articulate social interests, even their own inter-
ests. The development of social organizations has been extremely un-
even. There are more economic and social organizations are than politi-
cal ones, and more urban organizations than rural ones. Furthermore,
all these social organizations are highly dependent on the party-state.
To empower them to articulate social interests, the party-state has to,
first, grant them a greater degree of autonomy, and second, allow them
to form their own class identity.
Conclusion
Interest representation requires a systematic transformation of the CCP-
dominated Chinese political system. The CCP has claimed that it would
represent the interests of the majority of people. This is easier said than
done. Moreover, interest representation requires institutions for inter-
est aggregation and articulation, and aggregating and articulating di-
verse social interests requires political participation. In the long haul,
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democratization appears to be the only option for the CCP to achieve
interest representation and build long-term stability.
The party leadership may genuinely believe that it is doing what it
takes to strengthen the party-state by broadening its social base. As the
party metamorphosizes, there is still the nagging question of whether it
is prepared to democratize itself. No precedent exists to guide the CCP
through such unchartered waters and the risks of failure are enormous.
If the party falters, the breakup of the world's most populous nation is
a possibility. While Jiang may have taken a courageous step forward,
the onus is on Hu Jintao and other leaders to see the democratization
process through. The jury is still out on whether the CCP will succeed
in this endeavour.
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